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1 As  correctly  noticed  by  Vincent  Colapietro,  one  of  the  few  authors  who  have
approached  the  topic,  pragmatism  and  psychoanalysis  followed  parallel  paths
(Colapietro 2006: 191). As much as the two movements were facing similar problems
and  cultural  contexts,  they  did  not  cross  their  footsteps  nor  scholars  have  been
particularly interested in comparing their approaches and solutions. The distance is
understandable  also  from a  historical  perspective.  When James  met  Freud at  Clark
University in 1909 he was not impressed even though he thought that Freud’s enquiry
was worth being pursued.1 Freud thought Jamesian-like observations on religion to be
“unscientific” rising only James’s  despise (Colapietro 2006:  198).2 Morevoer,  Peirce’s
continuous  attacks  to  Sigwart’s  psychologism in  logic  took  the  separation  between
pragmatism and the analysis of psyche even further.
2 However,  a  different  and  less  obvious  comparison  between  psychoanalysis  and
pragmatism might be more fruitful. In his book Psychological Types, Jung has a chapter
on  James’s  tender-minded/tough-minded  distinction  (Jung  2009:  ch. 8).  Jung
misunderstands pragmatism as a sort of utilitarianism, but he highly praises James for
having understood the two types and having had the courage to apply them to the
history of philosophy. Moreover, even though he criticizes James’s bias in favor of the
tough-minded empiricist, Jung really thinks that the way to a complete self, a balanced
outcome of  our  conscious  and unconscious  personal  universes,  has  to  be  somehow
“pragmatic” before being authentically creative (Jung 2009: 254). In fact, in abandoning
Freudian orthodoxy Jung develops a form of psychoanalysis that takes a distance from
the positivist background that runs underneath Freud’s approach. That is why Jung’s
analysis might be an easier ground of comparison with pragmatism. On the pragmatist
side,  it  is  Peirce’s  view,  rather than  James’,  to  make  an  uberous  parallel  with
psychoanalysis possible.3 Peirce clarifies his aversion to psychologism as years went by.
But an attentive reading can tell that his attitude was due more to an improper mixing
up  of  disciplines  in  analyzing  reasoning  than  to  a  denial  of  the  importance  of
psychological traits in our reasoning. Therefore, only by looking at Peirce’s philosophy
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in its entirety we are able to grasp the importance that psychology has for Peirce, so
that a comparison of pragmatism and psychoanalysis can be conducted on more solid
grounds. In this way, we will see that Peirce’s interest for psychology shifts from its
role into logical analysis to a more comprehensive use within a synthetic pattern. As we
are  going  to  see,  this  unusual  comparison  is  due  to  the  strong  epistemic  and
philosophical  import  of  Jung’s  mature  theories  as  well  as  to  Peirce’s  tendency  to
provide a general theory of the mind, both conscious and unconscious.4 Therefore, this
paper will try to understand the attitude that Peirce had towards psychology (I),  to
recall the part of Jung’s theory that has to do with Peirce’s pragmatism (II), to assess
the relationship between the two authors and the reciprocal advantage in mutually
integrate their theories (III). I hope in this way to help opening a new terrain for some
contemporary developments of psychotherapy.
 
I. A Chronological Look at Peirce’s Attitude Toward
Psychology
3 In  the  anti-Cartesian series  written in  the  1860s  Peirce  tackles  the  issue  of  human
knowledge intertwining logical and psychological reasons even though he always held
an anti-psychologist attitude in logic. As it is well known, Peirce denies any form of
intuition and any power of knowing reality directly. We know everything through the
mediation  of  signs  and  there  is  no  knowledge  without  this  mediation.  Therefore,
psychologism understood as a way to ground logic upon the functioning of the psyche
is  denied.  On the contrary,  the functioning of  mind relies  upon the logic  of  signs.5
Notwithstanding this general picture of knowledge, Peirce’s discourse is often using
psychological elements. In describing knowledge in this way, Peirce also denies any
distinction  between  the  noumenon  and  the  phenomenon  hitting  to  a  sort  of  mild
idealism in which a phenomenological base is transformed into signs. In showing his
arguments sometimes he refers to experiments derived from descriptive psychology as
the one of the coin that disappears from our sight in certain circumstances or to the
psychological convictions with which we often misinterpret our inferential knowledge
(EP1: 5, and 15). Moreover, a first outcome of this revolutionary way of thinking reflects
itself on what we now consider the realm of psychology. In the paper Some Consequences
of Four Incapacities Peirce remarks that the ego has not such a decisive role in a reality
that  has  to  be  understood  as  an  infinite  flood  of  signs.  Rather,  we  understand
subjectivity in a derivative way, by ignorance:
Accordingly, just as we say that a body is in motion, and not that motion is in a
body we ought to say that we are in thought, and not that thoughts are in us. (EP1:
42)
The individual man, since his separate existence is manifested only by ignorance
and error, so far as he is anything apart from his fellows, and from what he and
they are to be, is only a negation. (EP1: 55)
Some years later, writing the celebrated series in which he states the pragmatic
maxim, Peirce identifies our beliefs with the satisfaction of getting rid of irritating
doubts. As much as the way to gain beliefs, to fix them, and to clarify our ideas is a
logical one, the description of the doubt heavily relies on a psychological approach,
provided that at that time psychology was in a inchoative state in which it was
difficult to discriminate it from medicine and philosophy. (EP1: 114)
4 During the 1880s,  the discovery of the logic of relatives,  the study of mathematical
continuity,  and the  attention to  the  phenomenological  base  of  signs  lead Peirce  to
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accept a metaphysical realism. By that term Peirce originally understood the logical-
ontological continuity between reality and knowledge. He contrasted it to nominalism,
namely  the  attitude of  thought  that  leaves  a  gap between reality  and any form of
acquiring knowledge. In this realist framework, he writes a sketch of a book that should
have been called “A Guess at the Riddle” (1887-88) and the series for The Monist in the
years 1891-93. In these works he devotes some significant paragraphs to the application
of  his  phenomenological  categories  (firstness,  secondness,  and  thirdness)  to
psychology. In the draft of “A Guess at the Riddle” Peirce recalls Kant’s traditional view
on psychology  (EP1:  257-62).  According  to  it,  psychology  is  divided  in  three  parts:
feeling,  willing,  knowing.  He will  match those distinctions with more sophisticated,
phenomenological  nuances  so  that  they  will  become  in  both  series  of  writings  1)
feeling, 2) sensation, 3) habit of action. The account of these trichotomy follows Peirce’s
phenomenological observations. Feeling is what is a pervasive unity in which we are
immersed. The smell of coffee during drowsiness or an emotion that takes our brain
away completely for a while could account for what Peirce means. When a distinction
between subject and object arises, when feeling meets some resistance, which is simply
anything that is not itself, a second arises. This secondness can have two forms. The
more passive one is  molition,  the sensation that  something else  is  operating on us
understood as subjects. Molition is the regular way in which we accept the world of
phenomena around us. Only in special cases we intervene exerting a more active role.
We name these moments as volition, which is only a special case of secondness. Finally,
when we need to introduce a third comprehensive element in order to make sense of a
situation,  like  when  we  need  an  interpreter  between  two  speakers  with  different
languages  or  a  lawyer  between  the  client  and  the  judge,  we  are  in  the  realm  of
thirdness. Introducing a third element means to create a habit of action, namely an
embodied path in which the two elements can enter into a relationship. Thinking is one
of our habits of action. For the sake of this paper it is worth noticing that when Peirce
introduces his third element, he also gives a logical account of it. In fact, he identifies
the introduction of a third element with a synthetical operation (EP1: 260). Synthesis is
here the logical function that presides over the taking of a habit of action. I  would
translate this operation as “recognizing an identity” between two different elements. If
we take these two elements as two moments of the same object (or more generally, and
pragmatistically,  of the same experience),  we will  gain a description of synthesis as
“recognizing an identity through change” linking together the problem of continuity
and the semiotic/logical one.6 It is also worth noticing that in all his logical writings
Peirce gives as granted that the logical path of semiosis and its synthetical processes
are working both at conscious and unconscious levels, as he makes clear in explaining
the  abducitve  logic  of  perceptual  judgments  (EP2:  226-33).  Self-control  and
consciousness describe only one part of the complex path of our epistemic processes.7
They rise at the level of normative sciences but not at a phenomenological level where,
according to his previous descriptions, we can find psychological elements.
5 At the turn of  century,  Peirce is  working on his  new classification of  science (EP2:
258-62). The idea of classification is an old positivist dream, but Peirce needs it because
he has to clarify the role that the different disciplines he has introduced play in the
system  of  science.  In  this  classification,  among  many  other  tasks,  he  finally
disentangles  phenomenology  and  psychology,  at  least  as  far  as  their  definitions  as
sciences are concerned. Phenomenology is part of philosophy and provides the basic
principles of the entire department of philosophy and special sciences, receiving its
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principles only from mathematics. It is a fundamental theoretical science. Psychology is
special science, that gives contents to many disciplines, philosophy included, but that
needs all those disciplines for its own principles. Put in this way, psychology disappears
from the hard kernel of philosophy. The reason for this exclusion is that Peirce wants
to  take  distance  from  Sigwart’s  approach  to  logic.  The  German  thinker,  always
negatively quoted by the American philosopher, said that at the bottom of our logical
inferences there must be a “feeling” that enables us to recognize what is true. Peirce
could not accept that inferences had to rely upon a “feeling” because inferences find
their justification in the pragmatic maxim. They find their justification forward and not
backward (EP2: 244-5). Peirce confirms his line of thought in 1911 when, in the failed
attempt of writing an introduction to the republication of the 1870s series and in “A
Sketch  of  Logical  Critics,”  he  tries  to  avoid  the  psychologism  of  the  satisfaction/
dissatisfaction language referred to belief. He stresses the dependence of belief from
reality saying that “there is no different belief that could long maintain itself in his
mind, while he remains sane, unless, indeed, he should discover that the real state of
facts  was  quite  contrary  to  his  belief”  (EP2:  456).  If  one  wished  beliefs  to  change
without any relationship with states of fact, he would be insane, and would need no
“alcohol or cocaine or anything else that might make you a more complete fool than
you care to be” (EP2: 456).
6 MS 645 and some letters to William James seem to confirm this change. Here Peirce
assumes  all  those  psychological  characteristics  as  feeling,  sensation,  and  habits  of
action  within  the  phenomenological  categories  now  defined  as  “prebits,”  while
psychology  is  a  special  science  that  shares  with  phenomenology  its  relying  on
observation, but has now become “Psychology Proper, by which I mean the Empirical
Science of the Modes of Functioning of finite Minds” (EP2:  501).  Therefore,  Peirce’s
consideration of psychology clarifies by passing from a form of inclusion within the
heart of  logic (the 1860s and 1870s series)  to a total  exclusion as empirical  science
preoccupied of the functioning of mind. However, he never misses the importance of
feeling, sensation, and habits of actions. He keeps considering them as fundamental by
shifting their study from a mixed phenomenological/psychological realm to a clearly
only-phenomenological discipline. Moreover, he never fails to consider these elements
in their working at both conscious and unconscious levels. In the meanwhile, Peirce
develops a profound metaphysical realism so that the underplaying of ego’s claims and
of any a priorism becomes more and more relevant to his philosophy. Peirce conceives
metaphysical  realism  as  a  complex  and  continuous  interplay  between  ontological-
logical  modalities  (possibility,  actuality,  necessity)  that  determine  the  growth  of
“concrete reasonableness,” the embodiment of rationality through history. In this way,
any  individual,  including  human  individuals,  is  but  a  realization  of  this  infinite
continuous of reality. The ego is really a small thing in this overwhelming development
of reality. His power is only to allow or not allow some actualizations by assenting or
not to the path of reality as it presents itself to him. The ego cannot have the claim to
master reality but only to be or not to be part of some specific path that reality is
taking.  In  answering  to  the  signs  that  reality  pushes  upon  him/her,  the  ego
accomplishes also the task of becoming himself/herself:
There  is  a  celebrated  passage  in  the  second  edition  of  the  Kritick  der  Reinen
Vernunft and a very notable one, in which Kant says that the “I think” – Das Ich
Denke – must be able to accompany all his ideas, “since otherwise they would not
thoroughly  belong  to  me.”  A  man  less  given  to  discoursing  might  remark  on
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reading this: “For my part, I don’t hold my ideas as my ownty-downty; I had rather
they were Nature’s and belonged to Nature’s author.” However, that would be to
misinterpret Kant. In his first edition, he does not call the act “the I think” but “the
object=x.” That which that act has to effect is the consecution of ideas; now, the
need of consecution of ideas is a logical need and is due not, as Kant thinks, to their
taking the form of the Urtheil, the assertion, but to their making an argument; and
this is not “I think” that always virtually accompanies an argument, but it is: “Don’t
you think so?” (MS 636: 24-6, 1909)
7 However, the difficult relationship between generals and individuals remains one of
the  central  topics  of  Peirce’s  mature  research.  He  never  succeeded  in  giving  an
adequate proof of the mathematical continuum that he envisaged but he succeeded in
giving a logical example of the kind of entanglement between generals and individuals
in  the  existential  graphs.  In  this  iconic  logic,  Peirce  proved that  there  is  a  way of
reasoning  which  happens  through  our  drawings  diagrams  (Maddalena  2015:  30-42;
Zalamea  2010).  The  actual  scribing  is  part  of  the  transformation  of  indeterminate
principles into general logical laws. The semiotic study of how the diagram has to be in
order to fulfill  its task is one of Peirce’s most important achievements to which he
referred  as  “my  chef  d’oeuvre”  (CP  4.347).  In  the  existential  graphs  we  see  the
actualization  of  Peirce’s  metaphysical  realism  even  though  Peirce  himself  did  not
realize that they opened up a new way of conceiving reasoning itself,  starting from
synthesis. As we are going to see, the new synthesis at which the graphs hinted was
more  open  to  include  psychological  characteristics  avoiding  the  problematic
disentangling of phenomenology and psychology that Peirce had to undertake in his
late years.
 
II. Jung’s Parallel (Metaphysical?) Realism
8 As soon as he detached himself from Freud’s orthodoxy, Jung started thinking to the
self in  a  different  broader  way.  He  accepted  the  powerful  recognizing  of  the
unconscious that Freud’s research uncovered. However, he did not want to think of it
as  the “trash can” of  the familiar  novel  to  which a  certain reading of  Freud could
reduce it (Jung et al. 1964: 32).8 Unconscious is not simply an individualistic item, as
Jung understood through the study of psychoses (Jung 1983: 65-7, and 214). While in
neuroses Freud’s method of recalling past traumas and repressions seems to work in
many cases, in psychoses the method reveals itself as insufficient. Observation of his
psychotic patients led Jung to understand that they were referring to a much broader
unconscious whose traces you can find in all human wisdom testimonies, from religious
to  mythical  texts,  from  poetry  to  alchemy  (Jung  1983:  238-9).  Therefore,  Jung
understood the unconscious as collective, a product of the entire history of humanity.
9 This  collective  unconscious  is  full  of  archetypes,  which  are  potential  forms  of
representation that anybody brings within himself/herself (Jung 1983: 68-71, and 84-5,
and 2007). Shadow, animus, anima, the old man, the hero are some of those figures that
are alive into the collective unconscious and that determine much of our emotional
behavior in both our dreams and memories. The life of this collective unconscious is
chaotic and potential. Its symbols are an immense flux that develops through history.
The task of the formation of personality is to give order and meaning or, at least, to
keep together this huge symbolic reality:
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Consciousness grows out of an unconscious psyche which is older than it, and which
goes on functioning together with it or even in spite of it. (Jung 1983: 218)
Man can live the most amazing things if they make sense to him. But the difficulty
is to create that sense. It must be a conviction, naturally; but you find that the most
convincing things man can invent are cheap and ready-made, and are never able to
convince him against his personal desires and fears. (Jung 1983: 90)
10 The difference between dream and awake is the kind of grasp of this symbolic, rich
continuous. In our dreams, we are not controlling it. In the same way, in psychoses the
self  fails  to  give  an order  or  a  unity  to  this  powerful,  chaotic,  emotional  flux  that
“possesses” it.
The material of a neurosis is understandable in human terms, but that of psychosis
is not […] neurotic contents can be integrated without appreciable injury to the ego,
but  psychotic  ideas  cannot.  They  remain  inaccessible,  and  ego-consciousness  is
more or less swamped by them. They even show a distinct tendency to draw the ego
into  their  “system.”  Such  cases  indicate  that  under  certain  conditions  the
unconscious is  capable of  taking over the role  of  the ego […].  This  tendency to
autonomy  shows  itself  above  all  in  affective  states,  including  those  of  normal
people. When in a state of violent affect one says or does things which exceeds the
ordinary. Not much is needed: love and hate, joy and grief, are often enough to
make the ego and the unconscious to change places […]. Groups, communities, and
even whole  nations  can be  seized  in  this  way by  psychic  elements.  (Jung 1983:
214-5)
11 In Jung’s view, selfhood becomes the goal of life, since to attain it we have to balance
the conscious and the unconscious parts of our personality.
I use the term “individuation” to denote the process by which a person becomes a
psychological “in-dividual,” that is, a separate indivisible unity or “whole” […] the
whole must necessarily include not only consciousness but the illimitable field of
unconscious occurrences as well, and that the ego can be no more than the center
of the field of consciousness. (Jung 1983: 212-3)
12 On the one hand, as I said before, the task of individuation is tantamount to give order
or  meaning  to  the  chaotic  potential  that  is  the  collective  unconscious,  full  of  its
archetypes.  On  the  other  hand,  the  task  means  to  undermine  the  conscious  ego-
centered  claims  that  tend  to  exclude  violently  the  unconscious  life  with  all  its
emotional  richness  and  its  safeguarding  warnings  for  the  future.  Therefore,
individuation  is  a  search  for  meaning  which  is  all  but  individualistic.  Meaning  is
something  that  we  “create”  only  by  working  on  the  infinite  flux  of  the  collective
unconscious in which we are born.
How the harmonizing of conscious and unconscious data is to be undertaken cannot
be indicated in the form of a recipe. It is an irrational life-process which expresses
itself in definite symbols. It may be the task of the analyst to stand by this process
with  all  the  help  he  can  give.  In  this  case,  knowledge  of  the  symbols  is
indispensable,  for  it  is  in  them  that  the  union  of  conscious  and  unconscious
contents is consummated. (Jung 1983: 226)
13 The different inclination towards listening to the ego involved in the actual reality of
life and objects and to the profound claim of the archetypes of the unconscious leads to
the  celebrated  psychological  types  that  Jung  reckoned  as  the  extroverted  and  the
introverted (Jung 2009: 15-8). The first is more determined from external objects also in
the way in  which he organizes  the internal  symbols  while  the second one is  more
determined by the internal symbols that he reverses on the exterior. It is no wonder
that Jung tried to find these two types along the entire human history giving a sort of
history of consciousness. In this task, he finds James’s two kinds of philosophers (Jung
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2009: 238-54). Jung read the tender minded Jamesian philosopher as a form of realist
and,  according to  his  classification,  as  an introverted.  On the contrary,  he saw the
tough-minded  as  a  nominalist  and  extroverted.  Loyal  to  the  result  of  his
psychoanalysis,  also  on  himself,  Jung  criticized  James’s  preference  for  the  tough-
minded and saw the necessity to find a balance between the two types. Similarly to
Peirce’s view of “taking habit,” balance is  a synthetic movement.  Individuation is  a
“synthetic process” (Jung 2013: 66). However, in a way Jung focuses upon the synthetic
instance trying to find a way to see the personality at work in the task of becoming a
self.  As  in  Peirce’s  graphs,  Jung  finds  a  way  to  analyze  the  synthesis  while  it  is
happening. This is the role of the drawing and the study of mandalas, ancient Buddhist
representations of cosmos. Drawing mandalas is the way in which we can see our self in
its  formation,  during  the  difficult  path  toward  selfhood,  beyond  the  egocentric
consciousness and the chaotic, collective unconscious.
When I began drawing the mandalas, however, I saw that everything, all the paths I
had been following, all the steps I had taken, were leading back to a single point –
namely, to the mid-point. It became increasingly plain to me that the mandala is
the  center.  It  is  the  exponent  of  all  paths,  it  is  the  path  to  the  center,  to
individuation  […].  Its  meaning  in  alchemy  is  somewhat  similar,  inasmuch  as  it
represents the synthesis of four elements which are forever tending to fall apart
[…]. Their object is the self in contradistinction to the ego, which is only the point
of reference for consciousness, whereas the self comprises the totality of psyche
altogether, i.e., conscious and unconscious. (Jung 1983: 234-7)
 
III. A First, Rough Comparison and Its Usefulness
14 The beginning of a comparison between Jung and Peirce includes realism, fallibilism,
symbolism, and “gestures” as existential graphs and mandalas.
15 First,  realism.  Both Peirce and Jung consider  the self  as  immersed within a  flux of
reality  that  has  a  broad  range  of  phenomenological,  logical,  and  ontological,
constitutive  elements.  Dreams  and  traditions,  science  and  alchemy,  poetry  and
experiments,  books,  characters,  facts,  thoughts,  feelings,  habits  are  all  elements  of
reality or, as pragmatists used to say, of “experience.” There is no dualism between
spiritual and corporeal for both pragmatists and Jung. Contrary to Freud, in this view
Jung  could  accept  symbols,  religious  sentiments,  or  beliefs as  constitutive  parts  of
experience (Jung 1983: 58). This rich realism is meta-physical, technically speaking. It
shares  many  characteristics  with  Duns  Scotus’  metaphysical,  medieval  realism.9
Pragmatists tend to focus on the conscious part of experience but is Peirce himself who
recognizes that there must be an unconscious level  and to attribute to it  the same
semiosis that happens at a conscious level. Peirce acknowledges a quasi-mind and a
reasoning that happens below the threshold of consciousness.10 Moreover, many times
Peirce refers to the collective experience of humanity that precedes us.11 In his article
Issues  of  Pragmaticism,  Peirce  acknowledges  the  root  of  common sense  itself  in  this
collective, sedimented experience (EP2: 349). James follows Peirce’s steps when he says
that “our fundamental ways of thinking about things are discoveries from exceedingly
remote  ancestors,  which  have  been  able  to  preserve  themselves  throughout  the
experience of all subsequent time” (James 1921: 170). On the other hand, confirming
the relationship with an ancient metaphysical realism, Jung does not hesitate to call the
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unconscious as a reality: “We call the unconscious ‘nothing,’ and yet it is a reality in
potentia” (Jung 1983: 216).
16 Second, Peirce downplays the role and the importance of the ego by ascribing many
functions to the ongoing semiotics to which the ego belongs. Moreover, he understands
that  the  small  fraction  of  the  continuous  flux  of  reality  that  human  beings  can
acknowledge and the limited semiotic with which we can develop our knowledge make
our knowledge deeply fallible. Even though we often find in Jung a more individualist
approach, the substantial difference that he stresses between the ego understood as the
center of the conscious personality and the self as the goal of the entire personality
that deals with both conscious and unconscious approaches the Swiss psychiatrist to
the American philosopher. Also for Jung, selfhood is an order to attain within a broader
flux of experience. The self is not the starting engine and creator of knowledge but a
point  of  passage  and sometimes  of  transformation  of  a  much broader  history  of  a
collective unconscious. 
For indeed our consciousness does not create itself  – it  wells up from unknown
depths.  In  childhood  it  awakens  gradually,  and  all  through  life  it  wakes  each
morning out of the depths of sleep from an unconscious condition. It is like a child
that is born daily out of the primordial womb of the unconscious. (Jung 1983: 417)
17 Third, the symbolic level is fundamental in both authors. Peirce’s lifelong research on
symbols  as  the  kind of  sign that  represents  its  object  by  interpretation could  help
clarifying many practical and theoretical tools that Jung uses as myths, dreams, and
archetypes. Archetypes are potential forms of representation:
The  archetype  in  itself  is  empty  and  purely  formal,  nothing  but  a  facultas
praeformandi,  a  possibility  of  representation  which  is  given  a  priori.  The
representations themselves are not inherited only the forms, and in that respect
they correspond in every way to the instincts, which are also determined in form
only. (Jung 1983: 155)
18 They are akin to the phenomenological ground of signs but it is clear that they fulfill
themselves taking symbolic representations in myths, dreams, etc. Jung’s detachment
from Freud began exactly with the different appreciation of the symbolic value of libido
in  the  case  of  incest  (Jung  1983:  58).  Moreover,  Jung  acknowledges  the  temporal
development of unconscious symbols that are both historical and teleologically driven
(Jung 1983: 216-7). Peirce’s semiotic can explain the drive toward completion, namely
the  intrinsic  teleology  of  symbols,  from  a  technical  point  of  view,  avoiding  Jung’s
sometimes esoteric formulations. This technical characteristic would account for the
“prophetic” role of our unconscious, one of the most striking aspects of Jung’s analysis,
with  which  the  Swiss  psychiatrist  recalls  and  amends  the  entire  history  of  the
interpretation of dreams. More in general, Peirce’s account of semiosis and kinds of
signs can help clarifying the symbolic representation of our unconscious strengthening
Jung’s interpretation of symbols.
19 Fourth, the need of a different synthesis and of synthetic gestures emerge from both
authors.  It  is this  fourth  point  that  this  paper  wants  to  stress.  Given  the  strong
metaphysical realism and the strong symbolism that they share, both Peirce and Jung
need an embodiment of this broad reality of experience into the singular experience of
the  individual.  Peirce  tried  to  solve  the  crucial  dilemma  of  the  universal  and  the
singular through mathematical studies of the continuum. He thought that individuals
were a discontinuity within a continuity but he tried to make sense of them by new
interpretations and demonstrations of the mathematical continuum. He failed but he
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envisaged  a  sort  of  possible  path  of  research  through  existential  graphs.  In  a
complementary way, Jung saw in individuation a completion of his realism, avoiding
from the beginning an interpretation of it as discontinuity. Jung found in mandalas a
way to figure out this unity of universality and individuality. Both existential graphs
and  mandalas  are  a  kind  of  representation  which  is  active,  namely  which  helps
synthetizing universals. Thought happens while we are drawing them and the actual
drawing  provides  new  general  meaning.  As  explained  elsewhere,  I  call  “complete
gesture” any action with a beginning and an end that implies a work through logical
modalities (possibilities, actualities, generalities) and carries on a meaning (Maddalena
2015:  68-84).  Existential  graphs  and  mandalas  can  be  complete  gestures.  They  are
synthetic, namely non-conceptual, tools that foster the knowledge of something new,
not already included in the concept. In other words, they recognize an identity through
changes.  Existential  graphs  are  apt  to  understand  the  logical  transformation  of  an
element into another, mandalas in Jung’s theory permit to see the transformation that
is happening through the self. Both of them are opening new ways for synthesis in a
logical and a psychological way.
 
IV. Conclusions
20 From a  historical  perspective,  the  first  conclusion regards  Peirce’s  philosophy.  The
American  philosopher  was  eager  to  get  rid  of  psychology  because  he  wanted  his
analysis  to  be  as  pure  as  possible  in  order  to  get  to  the  logical  content  of  our
knowledge. However, since he was a thorough analyst he could not avoid to consider
some psychological elements like feelings, sensations, and habits as fundamental parts
his epistemic path. But he decided to classify them as phenomenological items, leaving
to psychology only a secondary role, as the science that presides over the study of the
functioning of  mind.  However,  this  move testifies  that  Peirce’s  rich and pragmatist
version of knowledge cannot eliminate those elements that we normally consider as
psychological ones. Moreover, the kind of synthesis that his notes upon the semiotic
elements of the existential graphs illuminate needs to be comprehensive of any part of
our experience. Peirce stuck to an analysis of synthesis, but all of his philosophy, from
the pragmatic maxim onward hints at a form of synthesis different from the Kantian
one that depends on the form of analysis yet. Besides, Peirce wanted to have a synthesis
which used synthetic tools as well; this is why he kept explaining the semiotic elements
of the existential graphs. In these tools all elements of experience are included and
psychological elements are no exception to this need.
21 From  a  psychological  theoretical  perspective,  the  use  of  existential  graphs  and
mandalas as “complete gestures” suggests a direction also for analysis and can bridge
two different psychological  approaches.  In fact,  “complete gestures” hint towards a
psychosynthesis in which we discover ourselves while doing something, in this case
while drawing. Of course,  this synthetic move is already part of Jung’s approach to
which Peirce’s semiotic can provide a better understanding of symbolism and of the
phenomenological/semeiotic/psychological reading of the teleological search for unity
or  selfhood.  However,  the  rich  phenomenological  and  semiotic  background  of
pragmatism can also account for the “pragmatic” step that Jung himself considered
unavoidable for a fulfillment of a creation of meaning. In this pragmatic solution, there
is a synthesis and a balance obtained through “gestures,” in which we understand that
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the “creation” of meaning is more a gesture within a tradition of symbols (unconscious
and conscious) than a sporting out from nihil or an individualistic move. Moreover, we
understand that this reaching for a meaning is not analytic in its origin. It is a synthetic
move that happens in taking (synthetically) habits of action. Therefore, the philosophy
of gesture could bridge Jung’s analysis with the contemporary psychology behaviorism,
avoiding the lack of meaning of the latter and the sometimes too vague theorization
that afflicted the first raising of psychoanalysis at the beginning of the last century.12
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NOTES
1. In  that  occasion  James  was  favorably  impressed  by  Jung  while  he  thought  Freud  to  be
somehow “fixed” on his ideas (Colapietro 2006: 198).
2. Freud’s comments on the meeting at Clark University were limited to an appraisal of James’s
“fearless” attitude since during a stroll they took together James had to face an angina pectoris
attack (Simon 1967).
3. See Semetsky 2002 and Spinx 2003.
4. Colapietro  (2006)  correctly  observes  that  Peirce  is  paradoxically  the  pragmatist  who
acknowledged the relevance of the unconscious.
5. See also Calcaterra (2003: 17-83).
6. For this definition see Maddalena (2015: 43-67).
7. A  celebrated  quote  by  Peirce  can  give  the  sense  of  his  consideration  of  unconscious.
“Consciousness is like a bottomless lake in which ideas are suspended at different depths. Indeed,
these ideas themselves constitute the very medium of consciousness itself. Percepts alone are
uncovered by the medium. We must imagine that there is a continual fall of rain upon the lake;
which images the constant inflow of percepts in experience. All ideas other than percepts are
more or less deep, and we may conceive that there is a force of gravitation, so that the deeper
ideas are, the more work will be required to bring them to the surface” (CP7.533).
8. Freud’s theoretical notions on the issue are obviously more complex when examined in detail.
In The Ego and the Id (1923) Freud deals with a double characterization of the unconscious. Besides
the repressed impulses there are also inherited unconscious representations that we inherit from
our  ancestors,  as  he  made  clear  already  in  Totem  and  Taboo (1915).  However,  Jung’s  genetic
explication of libido that famously interrupted the scholar partnership between Freud and Jung
was a completely different kind of reading of the philogenesis of the unconscious.
9. For deepening the relationship between Duns Scotus’s and Peirce’s metaphysical realisms see
Mayorga 2007, and Maddalena 2008.
10. For the relevance of quasi-mind for psychological approach see Colapietro 2000.
11. For a very interesting analysis of Peirce’s entanglement of common sense, psychology, and
logic see Calcaterra 2004.
12. See  also  Santarelli  2017.  More  in  general,  I  thank  Matteo  Santarelli  for  insightful
conversations and suggestions on this topic.
Jung and Peirce
European Journal of Pragmatism and American Philosophy, IX-1 | 2017
11
ABSTRACTS
As correctly noticed by Vincent Colapietro, one of the few authors who have approached the
topic,  pragmatism and psychoanalysis  followed parallel  paths.  The most  obvious  comparison
between James and Freud did not seem to cast new light neither on the understanding of psyche
nor  on  the  two  movements  of  thought.  However,  a  different  and  less  obvious  comparison
between  Peirce  and  Jung  might  be  more  fruitful,  notwithstanding  the  progressive
antipsychologism of Peirce’s approach to logic. As we are going to see, this unusual comparison is
due to the strong epistemic and philosophical import of Jung’s mature theories as well  as to
Peirce’s  tendency to  provide a  general  theory of  the mind,  both conscious and unconscious.
Therefore, this paper will try to understand the attitude that Peirce had towards psychology (I),
to recall  the part of Jung’s theory that has to do with Peirce’s pragmatism (II),  to assess the
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